Road Work Ahead: Holding Government Accountable for Fixing America's Crumbling Roads and Bridges by Benjamin Davis et al.
Road Work Ahead
Holding Government Accountable for Fixing 
America’s Crumbling Roads and Bridges
Road Work Ahead
Holding Government Accountable for Fixing 
America’s Crumbling Roads and Bridges
Travis Madsen and Benjamin Davis, 
Frontier Group
Phineas Baxandall, Ph.D., 
U.S. PIRG Education Fund
April 2010
Thank you to Lilly Shoup at Transportation for America for special contributions to the 
content of this report. Additional thanks go to Andrew Amey, Linda Bailey and David 
Goldberg at Transportation for America and Michelle Ernst at Tri-State Transportation 
Campaign for providing analysis, editorial assistance and review. The authors thank Scott 
Bernstein at the Center for Neighborhood Technology and Rob Puentes at the Brookings 
Institution for their insightful feedback on drafts of this report. Finally, the authors are 
grateful to Tony Dutzik, Elizabeth Ridlington and Kari Wohlschlegel at Frontier Group 
for editorial assistance.
This report is made possible through the generous support of the Rockefeller Foundation.
The authors bear any responsibility for factual errors. The recommendations are those of 
U.S. PIRG Education Fund. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of our funders or those who provided review.
Copyright 2010 U.S. PIRG Education Fund.
With public debate around important issues often dominated by special interests pursuing 
their own narrow agendas, U.S. PIRG Education Fund offers an independent voice that 
works on behalf of the public interest. U.S. PIRG Education Fund, a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion, works to protect consumers and promote good government. We investigate prob-
lems, craft solutions, educate the public, and offer Americans meaningful opportunities for 
civic participation. For more information, please visit our Web site at www.uspirg.org.
Frontier Group conducts research and policy analysis to support a cleaner, healthier and 
more democratic society. Our mission is to inject accurate information and compelling 
ideas into public policy debates at the local, state and federal levels. For more information 
about Frontier Group, please visit our Web site at www.frontiergroup.org.
Cover photo: Jamie Van Buskirk, istockphoto.com
Layout: Harriet Eckstein Graphic Design
Acknowledgments
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 6
America’s Roads and Bridges Are in Disrepair 8
Thousands of Miles of America’s Roads Are Riddled with  
Potholes and Crumbling Asphalt 9
Too Many of America’s Bridges Are Structurally Deficient 10
Poorly Maintained Roadways Cause Harm 15
States Spend Billions on Expanded Roadway Capacity 18
Why Are America’s Roads and Bridges  
in Such Poor Shape? 20
Political Pressure Tilts the Playing Field Toward  
Construction of New Highways 20
Federal Policies Fail to Counter Inherent Biases Against Maintenance 23
State Policies Can Further Steer Spending Away from  
Adequate Maintenance 30
Fix It First: A 21st Century Vision for America’s  
Transportation Infrastructure 34
Policy Recommendations 35
Appendix 38
Notes 47
The Manhattan Bridge in New York City. Photo by Tim Schnurpfeil
Executive Summary
Over the last 50 years, America has built roads and bridges at a pace and scale that dwarfs most of the 
rest of the world. We’ve built a national 
highway network like no other, with more 
than 45,000 miles of interstate highway 
and 575,000 highway bridges. 
Now, much of that system is showing 
its age—and as maintenance needs con-
tinue to grow, we are falling farther be-
hind. Across the nation, drivers face more 
than 150,000 miles of roads in less than 
good condition and more than 70,000 
decaying bridges. Neglected mainte-
nance of roads and bridges acts as a con-
stant drain on our economy and a scourge 
on our quality of life. Rough and rutted 
roads cause accidents, damage vehicles, 
trigger traffic jams that lead to countless 
hours of delay, and waste money Ameri-
cans need for other expenses. On some 
occasions—such as the 2007 collapse of 
the I-35 bridge in Minneapolis, Minne-
sota—it can lead to profound tragedy. 
Why are America’s roads and bridges in 
such terrible shape? And who or what is to 
blame? 
One thing is for sure: the deterioration 
of our roads and bridges is no accident. 
Rather, it is the direct result of count-
less policy decisions that put other con-
siderations ahead of the pressing need to 
preserve our investment in the highway 
system. Political forces often undermine 
a strong commitment to maintenance. 
Members of Congress, state legislators 
and local politicians thrive on ribbon-cut-
tings. Powerful special interests push for 
new and bigger highways. Meanwhile, 
federal and state policies—which should 
provide strong guidance in the wise use 
of taxpayer dollars—often fail to achieve 
the proper balance between building new 
infrastructure and taking care of what we 
already have built. 
To fix our roads and bridges, America 
first must fix our transportation policies. To 
counteract the tendencies to neglect repair 
and maintenance, we must adopt strong “fix 
it first” rules that give priority to mainte-
nance of our existing roads and bridges, set 
national goals for the condition of our trans-
portation system, and hold state govern-
ments accountable for achieving results.
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America’s roads and bridges are in 
disrepair.
•	 According to the Federal Highway 
Administration, 45 percent (or more 
than 150,000 miles) of federal high-
ways and major roads were in poor, 
mediocre or fair condition as of 2008. 
Metropolitan areas tend to have 
the roughest roads. In 2008, nearly 
two-thirds of urban roadways offered 
a poor, mediocre or fair ride. Major 
cities—including Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Washington, D.C., New 
York City and New Orleans—had the 
worst road conditions. Typical drivers 
in these cities pay as much as $750 
per year in extra vehicle maintenance 
costs due to rough road conditions. 
•	 The American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation Of-
ficials estimates that poor road 
conditions cost U.S. motorists $67 
billion a year in repairs and operating 
costs—an average of $335 per motor-
ist.
•	 The United States Department of 
Transportation rates 12 percent (or 
71,000) of the nations’ bridges as 
“structurally deficient,” which means 
that a bridge has a major defect in its 
support structure or its deck is crack-
ing and deteriorating. In some states, 
more than 20 percent of bridges are 
structurally deficient.
•	 Generally, engineers build bridges in 
the United States for a useful life of 
50 years. The average age of Amer-
ica’s bridges is now 43 years, with 
185,000 over 50 years old. By 2030, 
that number could double.
•	 The American Society of Civil 
Engineers awarded the condition of 
the nation’s bridges a “C” grade and 
roadways a near-failing “D-“ grade 
in 2009. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation estimates that merely 
sustaining the condition and perfor-
mance of the federal highway system 
would require investing more than 
$100 billion per year—almost $30 
billion more than current spending 
levels.
Special interest pressure tilts the play-
ing field toward the construction of 
new and ever-wider highways at the 
expense of repair and maintenance.
•	 By and large, states award new 
contracts for major construction 
projects, but perform ongoing main-
tenance in-house. As a result, there 
is a strong outside political pressure 
for new bridge or highway construc-
tion, but little outside pressure for 
preventative maintenance and regular 
repairs.
•	 The highway lobby is a powerful po-
litical force that stands to profit from 
government spending on new high-
ways. In 2008, highway interests gave 
more than $130 million to candidates 
for state and federal office. Accord-
ing to an investigation by the Center 
for Public Integrity, more than 1,800 
different special interest groups are 
vying to influence the contents of the 
next transportation authorization bill. 
Many of the real-estate or construc-
tion interests involved have specific 
new construction projects they are 
attempting to move forward.
•	 Since 1985, the nation has built 
enough roadways to circle the globe 
more than five times. On average 
from 2006 to 2008, states spent more 
than $8 billion in federal capital 
annually to build new roads or add 
highway capacity. In contrast, states 
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spent $4.8 billion in federal dol-
lars per year on repairing deficient 
bridges.
•	 Despite deep maintenance backlogs, 
states in 2009 committed almost a 
third of federal stimulus funds—$6.6 
billion—to new capacity road and 
bridge projects rather than to re-
pair and other preservation projects. 
Kentucky directed 88 percent of its 
stimulus funds to new roads, rather 
than fixing the 39 percent of its roads 
that are in poor condition, or its 573 
structurally deficient bridges. Building 
new roads will only increase the state’s 
maintenance burden in the future. 
U.S. transportation policy fails to prop-
erly emphasize highway and bridge 
maintenance. Responsibility for the 
road and bridge crisis begins at the top, 
with federal transportation policies 
that allocate vast amounts of money to 
the states with little direction and no 
accountability.
•	 Spending is not targeted toward 
specific goals. Federal highway 
programs largely dole out money to 
states based on standardized fund-
ing formulas and with no priori-
tization of projects based on their 
importance. States are guaranteed 
to receive funds totaling a minimum 
of 92 percent of the federal gas taxes 
collected in their state, regardless of 
whether the state spends the money 
wisely or in a way that furthers the 
interest of the nation as a whole. 
Moreover, federal funds designated 
specifically for maintenance are given 
out with no accountability for actu-
ally achieving specific maintenance 
standards. 
•	 There is little accountability for 
proper maintenance. In theory, 
federal law authorizes the U.S. 
Transportation Secretary to withhold 
funds from states that fail to properly 
maintain roads and bridges; but the 
law does not define “proper main-
tenance” and the power is virtually 
never used.
•	 States can divert maintenance 
money to other uses. States can, 
and often do, shift federal money 
intended for maintenance to other 
projects—including the construction 
of new roads and bridges. Between 
2005 and 2007, states redirected 
one out of every 10 federal dollars 
intended for bridge repair to other 
purposes. In the three years prior to 
the I-35 bridge collapse, Minnesota 
diverted more than 50 percent of its 
federal bridge funding away from 
bridge repair and maintenance.
•	 Perverse incentives undermine 
progress. States receive more fed-
eral bridge maintenance and repair 
money when they face higher bills 
for bridge repair. The system inad-
vertently encourages states to neglect 
bridge maintenance and shift the 
money to other uses: Not only do 
federal funding formulas fail to re-
quire states to achieve specific targets 
for bridge maintenance, but fixing 
bridges actually could reduce the 
amount of federal money received in 
future years.
Congressional earmarks—in which 
members of Congress designate fund-
ing for specific projects—further tilt 
spending away from maintenance.
•	 The most notorious transportation 
earmark in recent history—for con-
struction of the $223 million “Bridge 
to Nowhere” in Alaska—was to have 
been partially paid for with funds 
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from the federal Highway Bridge 
Program, which cannot normally be 
spent to build new bridges.
•	 The 2005 transportation law cre-
ated a program intended to identify 
and fund transportation projects of 
“national and regional significance” 
on a competitive basis, based on a 
set of objective criteria. However, 
members of Congress used earmarks 
to predetermine the winners of the 
grants, bypassing any national system 
of prioritization.
•	 In 2008, Congress directed just 10 
percent of earmarked funds in the 
annual transportation appropriations 
bill to repair or maintain a bridge, 
tunnel, or overpass. For example, the 
delegation from Mississippi secured 
funding for 19 earmarked projects 
at a cost of $29 million, and de-
spite having a backlog of over 3,000 
structurally deficient bridges in the 
state, none of their earmarks went to 
bridge repair.
State transportation funding policies 
are often similarly short-sighted, focus-
ing on the creation of politically popu-
lar new highways rather than maintain-
ing existing roads and bridges.
• According to the U.S. Government  
Accountability Office, state transpor-
tation agencies tend to weigh politi-
cal support and public opinion more 
heavily than cost-benefit calculations 
when deciding how to spend federal 
transportation dollars. As a result, state 
transportation agencies can neglect 
projects—like ongoing maintenance—
that can extend the life and minimize 
the life-cycle costs of roads and bridges. 
•	 Some states underfund road and 
bridge repair in metropolitan areas, 
even though they are home to more 
than 80 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion and economic output and tend 
to have the greatest needs. These 
states, like the federal government, 
dole out transportation money 
partially based on geographic shares 
rather than focusing funds on the 
most important needs and opportuni-
ties. Georgia, for example, divides 
the bulk of its transportation dollars 
by congressional district, leading the 
state to spend 50 percent more per 
capita on areas outside metropolitan 
Atlanta than inside, according to 
analysis by the Atlanta Journal Con-
stitution.
•	 States bend the definition of “main-
tenance” projects to include road or 
bridge expansion, further reducing 
the amount of money available for 
true maintenance. In Wisconsin, for 
example, a project to devote $1.9 
billion to repair a 38-mile section of 
Interstate 94 actually expanded the 
number of lanes on the road from 
four to eight. The state is demolish-
ing every overpass bridge along the 
segment and building new ones to 
accommodate the new lanes, despite 
the fact that only one was structur-
ally deficient. As a result, millions of 
dollars will actually go toward the 
construction of new infrastructure 
rather than repair.
Spending more money on transpor-
tation won’t fix America’s roads and 
bridges without a top-to-bottom shift 
in funding priorities and policies. Spe-
cific recommendations include:
•	 Prioritize highway and bridge 
maintenance and repair. States 
should be held accountable for 
properly maintaining roads and 
bridges, and should be required to 
4 Road Work Ahead
demonstrate progress to the public 
according to specific, measurable 
benchmarks. 
•	 Reorganize federal highway 
programs to focus exclusively on 
either maintenance or new con-
struction. One program should 
cover all new infrastructure construc-
tion, ensuring that new highway or 
bridge projects undergo rigorous 
evaluation and prioritization at the 
federal level—much like the New 
Starts program for public transpor-
tation projects. Another program 
should consolidate infrastructure 
preservation efforts to better dedicate 
resources to repair and maintenance.
•	 Require states receiving federal 
aid to plan for future maintenance 
before building new roads. States 
receiving federal transportation funds 
should calculate and publicly report 
the 10-, 20- and 50-year maintenance 
costs of all new or improved infra-
structure projects and demonstrate 
that such funds will be available over 
the lifespan of the infrastructure. 
Such requirements are commonplace 
in state applications for federal tran-
sit investments.
•	 Measure performance the right 
way. The federal government should 
establish performance measures con-
nected to national goals that drive 
investment decisions, such as increas-
ing the fraction of roads in good 
condition or reducing the number of 
vehicles traveling over structurally 
deficient bridges. States should re-
port progress to the public annually.
•	 Reward states for good perfor-
mance on national objectives. 
States already receive bond ratings 
for how well they act to meet future 
obligations to investors who buy 
their assets. By that same principle, 
the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion could develop a system to rate 
states based on their progress, or 
lack thereof, on preventative main-
tenance, deferred maintenance, and 
resources dedicated to repair. States 
with unsatisfactory ratings would be 
prohibited from transferring funds 
out of federal repair programs for 
other purposes, and would risk los-
ing their full federal funding over 
time.
•	 States, too, should create fix it 
first policies – Every state should 
adopt Fix it First policies analogous 
to those in Maryland, New Jersey 
and Illinois, requiring state DOTs to 
focus on the rehabilitation of existing 
facilities before building new highways.
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It’s a situation every parent faces. A mom or dad walks into a room to see their child playing carelessly with a new toy. 
Invariably, the following words will be 
spoken: “If you break that, I’m not buying 
you a new one.” 
For decades, federal and state transpor-
tation decision-making has been geared 
toward buying shiny new toys … and not 
so much toward taking good care of the 
ones we already have. Too often, no one 
has taken responsibility for insisting that 
our nation’s roads and bridges be scrupu-
lously maintained, so that drivers remain 
safe and that we get the maximum possible 
life out of our investments. 
Now, America’s transportation system is 
in crisis. The vast amount of highway and 
bridge infrastructure we have built over 
the last half-century is rapidly aging, with 
much of it beginning to reach the end of its 
useful life. The pools of money that once 
funded lavish spending on new highways 
and bridges are drying up. And the need 
for investment in clean, efficient trans-
portation options—including rail, public 
transportation and safe streets for walking 
and bicycling—continues to grow. 
The Highway Trust Fund—the primary 
pot of money funding transportation im-
provements in the United States—ran 
out of money in September 2008. Over-
all spending from the trust fund has ex-
ceeded revenues since 2002. Meanwhile, 
Congress has been plugging the gap with 
revenues out of the General Fund.   The 
Congressional Budget Office has estimat-
ed that if current spending patterns con-
tinue, the nation would have to come up 
with another $100 billion between 2010 
and 2018 to fund federal transportation 
activities.   Where that money could come 
from is anyone’s guess.
Historically, most of the money used 
to fund highway construction has come 
from motorists. The Highway Trust Fund 
is largely filled with revenues from the 
federal gas tax, which has not been ad-
justed for inflation since 1993—meaning 
that the Fund buys a third less than it did 
20 years ago.   Existing gas taxes and other 
fees no longer cover the cost of building 
and maintaining infrastructure, much less 
the indirect costs caused by traffic, pollu-
tion, accidents or energy security needs. 
The taxpayer is forced to shoulder more 
Introduction
6 Road Work Ahead
and more of these burdens each year. 
At the same time, the nation increasingly 
faces the need to invest in other transporta-
tion options—particularly, clean, efficient 
forms of transportation, such as high-speed 
rail and public transit. These modes are 
vital to reducing the nation’s dependence 
on oil and securing the long-term health 
of the economy. Americans recognize, and 
tell pollsters, that an increasing portion of 
transportation funds should be dedicated 
toward public transportation systems.   
Despite the urgent need to maintain 
our existing system—and growing de-
mands for investment in other modes of 
transportation—public officials have often 
reacted to the budget squeeze by putting 
off needed repairs or delaying preventa-
tive maintenance, instead directing funds 
toward building new and wider highways. 
In 2008, states spent more than $15 billion 
in capital to build new roads, reconstruct 
roads with added capacity, or perform ma-
jor widening projects.   To make matters 
worse, many of these projects are of ques-
tionable value in addressing our mobility 
needs over the long haul. In many cases 
the new lanes will provide little more than 
a temporary traffic fix, becoming clogged 
again themselves in a matter of years, while 
increasing our dependence on oil and rais-
ing pollution levels.
Years of deferred maintenance have left us 
with hundreds of billions of dollars worth of 
fixes to be made to our roads and bridges. 
As this report makes clear, fixing our 
roads and bridges means fixing the way we 
allocate money and prioritize transporta-
tion projects. The answer is not necessar-
ily to spend more. In fact, the Government 
Accountability Office has found that in-
creased federal spending on highway pro-
grams over the years has tended to displace 
state and local funds that otherwise would 
have been spent on highways and bridges.  
Rather, as a succession of blue-ribbon 
commissions and numerous outside ana-
lysts have concluded, we need to reform 
our national system for funding trans-
portation and establish clear goals and 
priorities, performance standards, and 
strong accountability measures. A key first 
priority must be to invest in preventative 
maintenance of the most critical links in 
our transportation system, ensuring the 
greatest return from the trillions citizens 
have already invested in the system.
Those fixes won’t be easy. But the time 
has come for America to face its bridge and 
highway maintenance problems squarely, 
and make a strong national commitment 
to ensuring that the legacy of one or our 
greatest national investments endures for 
generations to come.
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Over the last 50 years, America has built roads and bridges at a pace and scale that dwarfs most of the 
rest of the world. We’ve built a national 
highway network like no other, with more 
than 45,000 miles of interstate highway 
and 575,000 highway bridges.
America’s roads and bridges are severely 
threatened. More than 70,000 bridges are 
“structurally deficient,” which means that 
engineers have identified a major defect in 
a bridge support structure or the bridge’s 
deck is cracking and deteriorating. More 
than 150,000 thousand miles of highways 
and major roads are similarly in less than 
good repair. That total is more than three 
times the entire distance envisioned for 
the nation’s Interstate Highway System 
when it was first approved by Congress.  
Inadequately maintained roads and 
bridges are more than just a hassle. They 
cause accidents, damage vehicles, and lead 
to expensive traffic delays. Moreover, al-
lowing roads and bridges to slip into disre-
pair ends up costing governments billions 
of additional dollars, since the cost of re-
constructing a piece of infrastructure can 
exceed the cost of maintenance by as much 
as seven times.   Without adequate inspec-
tion and maintenance, critical transporta-
tion infrastructure can even fail—as dem-
onstrated by the 2007 collapse of the I-35 
bridge in Minnesota or the 2009 closing of 
the Crown Point Bridge linking Vermont 
and upstate New York.
The Federal Highway Administration 
estimates that the nation would have to 
spend more than $100 billion annually just 
to maintain roads and bridges at current 
conditions and levels of performance—
and billions more to improve the system. 
Without changes in the way highway funds 
get spent, the repair bill will only increase 
over time, especially since so many road-
ways and bridges were built between the 
Depression-era public works projects of 
the 1930s and the completion of the Inter-
state highway network in the 1980s—and 
have hence begun to reach the end of their 
useful lives.
America’s Roads and Bridges 
Are in Disrepair
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Thousands of Miles of 
America’s Roads Are  
Riddled with Potholes and 
Crumbling Asphalt
According to the Federal Highway Admin-
istration, 45 percent of our nation’s major 
roadways were in less than good condition 
as of 2008.   In several states, well over half 
of all highways and major roads are rough, 
crumbling, or riddled with potholes. (See 
Table 1.) For example, according to the 
Federal Highway Administration, only 18 
percent of highways in the state of New 
Jersey are in good condition.   This is to 
say nothing of the condition of our local 
roadway system—which no federal agency 
tracks. Because of the overall dire state of 
our roadways, the American Society of 
Civil Engineers gave our nation’s roads a 
“D-minus” grade in 2009.  
Metropolitan areas—where more than 
80 percent of Americans live and where 
most economic output is generated—tend 
to have the roughest roads.   In 2008, 63 
percent of major roadways in urban areas 
were in less than good repair.   (See Figure 
1.) Major cities—including Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, Washington, D.C., New 
York City and New Orleans—had the 
worst road conditions.   Since 1995, road-
way conditions on rural highways have 
tended to improve, while the trend has 
been toward worse conditions on major 
metropolitan roads, where maintenance 
needs are greater.   Even after Los Angeles 
filled 800,000 potholes in 2008, the city 
still had the “bumpiest roads in Califor-
nia.”  
Fewer than 80 percent of the Interstate 
highways in America’s cities are in good 
condition, with the Interstates in America’s 
largest cities in greatest disrepair.   For ex-
ample, according to the Federal Highway 
Administration, the District of Columbia 
lacks a single mile of Interstate in “good” 
condition.  
Good
37%
Fair
40%
Mediocre
14%
Poor
9%
Good
61%
Fair
34%
Mediocre
4%
Poor
1%
Figure 1: Major Roadways in Metropolitan Areas are 
In Worse Shape17
1A . Metropolitan Areas
1B. Rural Areas
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Too Many of America’s 
Bridges Are Structurally  
Deficient
Many of America’s bridges are in disrepair. 
The United States Department of Trans-
portation rates 12 percent—or 71,000—of 
the nations’ bridges as “structurally defi-
cient,” which means that a bridge has a 
major defect in its support structure or 
its deck is cracking and deteriorating.   In 
2009, the American Society of Civil En-
gineers rated the condition of America’s 
bridges with a mediocre “C” grade.  
Pennsylvania and Oklahoma had more 
than 5,000 bridges rated structurally de-
ficient in 2009—accounting for 27 and 
22 percent of all bridges in these states, 
respectively. In comparison, less than 4 
percent of the bridges in Nevada, Arizona, 
and Delaware are structurally deficient. 
See Table 2 and the appendix on page 40 
for a listing of states based on the fraction 
of total bridges, or total bridge area, that 
are structurally deficient. 
Allowing a bridge to become structur-
ally deficient can lead to lead to weight re-
strictions, bridge closures, and in rare cas-
es, collapse. The San Francisco Bay Bridge 
in California, connecting San Francisco 
and Oakland, is a good example. When an 
eastern section of the bridge was being re-
placed just before Labor Day weekend in 
2009, inspection crews discovered a crack 
in an eyebar, which is a support connector 
similar to a link in a bicycle chain. Workers 
repaired the section to prevent the bridge 
deck adjacent to the crack from collaps-
ing. William Ibbs, a professor of civil en-
gineering at the University of California 
at Berkeley, explained in the Contra Costa 
Times that the bridge’s structural problems 
were a result of heavy use and age. “It’s a 
73-year-old bridge,” he said, “and it’s got-
ten a lot of wear and tear with 260,000 ve-
hicles a day going across it.”   Abolhassan 
Alaska 35% 75% 1
Rhode Island 34% 84% 2
New Jersey 33% 82% 3
Vermont 28% 63% 4
California 28% 76% 5
Massachusetts 26% 71% 6
Hawaii 26% 90% 7
Louisiana 23% 56% 8
Mississippi 17% 57% 9
Illinois 17% 57% 10
State Percent of 
Roads in Poor or 
Mediocre 
Condition
Percent of 
Roads in 
Less than Good 
Condition
Rank, Highest 
Fraction of Roads 
in Poor or Mediocre 
Condition
Table 1: Ten States with the Roughest Roads, 200820
Rankings and data for all states can be found in the Appendix on page 38.
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Astaneh, another U.C. Berkeley professor, 
believes that the fracture was specifically 
caused by metal fatigue, and that “it is a 
problem likely to afflict the remaining 
[264] eyebars on the bridge.”  
Unfortunately, the repair wasn’t perfect. 
In late October 2009, a newly installed 
steel rod snapped, sending several tons of 
steel chunks down onto the bridge surface 
during the evening rush hour. Luckily, the 
accident damaged just three vehicles and 
caused only minor injuries. Commuters 
were forced to use other routes or means 
of transportation for six days while work-
ers repaired the new damage.   The Sacra-
mento Bee reported that some commuters 
were so frightened by the incident that 
they continue to avoid using the bridge.  
California Department of Transpor-
tation officials testified before the state 
legislature in December 2009, saying that 
they still did not know why the bridge had 
cracked or why the steel rod had failed. 
The agency is now sending bridge inspec-
tors to check on key parts of the bridge ev-
ery three months—much more frequently 
than the federally mandated minimum of 
one inspection every two years.   Altogeth-
er, the repairs for the fall 2009 incident 
will cost $21.5 million.  
The deterioration of our nation’s 
bridges goes well beyond metal fatigue. 
For example:
• The Brooklyn Bridge’s anchorages, 
ramps, and approaches are corroding 
and crumbling. Some of the ramps 
have cracks as wide as 8 inches, and 
several of the beams that support the 
bridge’s approaches and spans are 
severely corroding.   
• In 2007, Idaho’s Dover Bridge—used 
by 5,000 motorists everyday—nearly 
lost a 30-inch-by-30 inch section of 
deck, because wear, tear, and poor 
maintenance had reduced the sec-
tion’s support to rebar alone.   
• Until it was demolished at age 80 
in December 2009, the 2,184-foot-
long Crown Point Bridge connecting 
New York and Vermont was at risk 
of collapse because the river current 
and weather elements had severely 
eroded the concrete piers and steel 
support structure at the base of the 
bridge.  
The Difference Between Structurally Deficient and 
Functionally Obsolete Bridges
A structurally deficient bridge suffers from a design flaw or wear and tear, which has led to a major defect in a support structure or a cracking and deteriorating 
deck.21 These flaws reduce the margin of safety offered by the bridge, and could 
require restrictions on the weight or type of vehicles that can use the bridge, or 
even closure. In contrast, a functionally obsolete bridge has a flaw in configura-
tion that does not line up with modern standards, such as narrow shoulders or a 
sharp-angled approach roadway. A functionally obsolete bridge can still carry traf-
fic safely without major repairs—albeit not as quickly as a new bridge. This report 
focuses on the “structurally deficient” category as the best indicator of the need for 
bridge maintenance and repair. 
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America’s Bridges Are Aging and 
Repair Needs Will Grow
The number of structurally deficient 
bridges will only increase over time, as old 
bridges reach the end of their designed 
lives. Given that new bridge construction 
first peaked during the public works proj-
ects of the Great Depression and peaked 
again during the first 15 years of establish-
ing the Interstate highway system (1956 
to 1971), many of our nation’s bridges are 
now several decades old.   Since the aver-
age age of a bridge in the United States 
is 43 years and the typical design lifespan 
of a bridge is 50 years, the rate at which 
bridges become structurally deficient is 
likely to increase over the next decade.  In 
2008, the Government Accountability Of-
fice found that, as bridges continue to age, 
“states and local agencies may see a spike 
in their need for bridge rehabilitation and 
replacement funding over the next 15 
years.”  
More than 185,000 highway bridges 
(out of 575,000 total) are now 50 years 
old or older. By 2030, that number could 
double.   (See Figure 2.) 
The Northeast and the Missouri and 
Mississippi river valleys currently have the 
highest concentration of aging bridges. 
(See Figure 3.) More than 50 percent of 
the bridges in Massachusetts and Maine 
are already more than 50 years old, while 
between 35 percent and 50 percent of 
bridges in states such as Oklahoma and 
Pennsylvania have reached this age. 
Over time, the distribution of aging 
bridges is likely to expand across the coun-
try. (See Figure 3.) By 2018, 21 states will 
have at least 35 percent of their bridges ex-
ceed 50 years of age. By 2028, older bridges 
will become the majority in 48 states and 
the District of Columbia. As these bridges 
age, repair needs will grow. As shown in 
Figure 4, older bridges are more likely to 
suffer from structural deficiencies.
-
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Figure 2. Past and Projected Number of U.S. Highway Bridges More Than 50 Years Old
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2008
2018
2028
Figure 3: The Percentage of Bridges 50 Years Old or Older by State: 2008, 2018 and 202836
Percent of Bridges more 
than 50 Years Old
Less than 35 percent
35 to 50 percent
50 to 65 percent
Greater than 65 percent
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 1 Rhode Island 163 27%
 2 Pennsylvania 6,060 20%
 3 California 3,228 19%
 4 Massachusetts 593 16%
 5 Oklahoma 5,286 16%
 6 Vermont 437 16%
 7 Iowa 5,358 14%
 8 Wyoming 401 13%
 9 Maine 364 13%
 10 North Carolina 2,442 13%
Rank State Number of 
Structurally 
Deficient 
Bridges
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Figure 4: Percent of U.S. Bridges by Age that Are Structurally Deficient (as of 
December 2009)37
Table 2: Top Ten States for Percent of Bridge Deck Area on Structurally  
Deficient Spans, as of December 200938
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Poorly Maintained  
Roadways Cause Harm
As road conditions deteriorate, drivers in-
cur greater and greater costs every time 
they get behind the wheel. As the amount 
of road decay, potholes, bumps, clogged 
drainage systems, and damaged bridges 
increases, so too do the number of acci-
dents, the amount of money spent on car 
maintenance, and the number of hours 
consumed by driving.
Poor Roadway Maintenance 
Causes Accidents
Roads in disrepair create unsafe driv-
ing conditions that can lead to accidents. 
Without regular maintenance, roads turn 
into crumbled asphalt, erosion narrows 
shoulders and lanes, damaged drainage 
systems create hazardous floods, and bro-
ken retaining walls can allow boulders and 
other obstacles to obstruct a safe path. 
These accidents can cause injury and 
death. The American Society of Civil En-
gineers notes that “roadway conditions are 
a significant factor in about one-third of 
traffic fatalities.”   Poor road conditions 
contributed to more than 11,000 of the 
34,000 highway fatalities in 2009.  
People are also killed and injured 
when bridges collapse. The most dra-
matic bridge collapse in recent memory 
occurred on Wednesday, August 1, 2007, 
when the 1,907-foot-long Interstate 35 
Bridge, connecting Minneapolis, col-
lapsed 108 feet into the Mississippi River, 
killing 13 people and injuring 145 others.  
The bridge was 40 years old and had been 
labeled “structurally deficient” by the 
Federal Highway Administration. The 
National Transportation Safety Board 
concluded that in this case, the probable 
cause of the collapse was an error in the 
design of the gusset plates, aggravated by 
added weight on the bridge on the day 
the structure failed.  
Poorly Maintained Roadways  
Cost Motorists
Roads in poor condition damage vehi-
cles—damage that costs motorists heavily. 
Accidents caused by poor road conditions 
can cost individual drivers and their in-
surance companies thousands of dollars. 
Even without a collision, drivers pay the 
repair costs of tires and shock absorbers 
that are worn out and destroyed by rough 
and uneven roads. The American Asso-
ciation of State Highway and Transporta-
tion Officials (AASHTO) estimates that 
poor road conditions cost U.S. motorists 
$67 billion a year in repairs and operating 
costs—or an average of $335 per motorist.  
(See Table 3.)
Drivers in urban areas spend even more 
money on vehicle repairs. Because of the 
especially poor road conditions of cities, 
these motorists pay the additional main-
tenance costs of fixing their tires, shock 
absorbers, and other car parts that deterio-
rate due to rough roads. AASHTO estimates 
that drivers living in metropolitan areas 
 1  New Jersey  $596 
 2  California  $590 
 3  Hawaii  $503 
 4  Rhode Island  $473 
 5  Oklahoma  $457 
 6  Maryland  $425 
 7  Missouri  $410 
 8  New York  $405 
 9  Mississippi  $394 
 10  Louisiana  $388
Rank State Additional
Operating
Cost
Table 3: Top Ten States by Average  
Additional Operating Costs Due to 
Rough Roads45
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with the worst road conditions are paying 
as much as $750 additionally per year in 
extra costs.   (See Table 4.)
Poor Road Maintenance  
Increases Delays
Roadways in disrepair cause traffic and de-
lays. Drivers attempting to navigate a sec-
tion of damaged road sometimes swerve to 
avoid potholes, or lose control of the vehi-
cle while traveling over excessively rough 
and uneven patches of pavement. Result-
ing accidents can drastically slow or stop 
traffic. Even without an accident, drivers 
must slow down to maneuver safely and 
comfortably through or around a section 
of rough road. Not only do these obstruc-
tions slow the driver, but they also cause 
bottlenecks that can slow the traffic be-
hind them, and create traffic jams.
Bridge collapses or closures can be dev-
astating to the nearby communities by 
forcing delivery trucks to travel longer dis-
tances, delaying emergency vehicles from 
reaching destinations, and costing local 
businesses time and money. Bridges are 
built to provide a shortcut across natural 
obstacles. So, when bridges collapse or are 
closed due to risk of collapse, drivers must 
take circuitous alternate routes. These de-
tours create delays—and increase the cost 
of freight delivery—because of increased 
activity and traffic on substitute bridges or 
the long distance between the nearest sub-
stitute bridge and the inoperable one. 
For example, when highway officials 
closed the Crown Point Bridge due to ex-
cessive wear on the support structure, the 
regional economy—and the lives of Ver-
monters and New Yorkers living on either 
side of the bridge—suffered. Many people 
who live and work on separate sides of 
the bridge are now forced to drive an ad-
ditional two hours when traveling to and 
from work because Crown Point was the 
only easily accessible bridge. In addition, 
the bridge’s closing is hurting businesses 
because fewer visitors are passing though 
the towns adjacent to the bridge, and be-
cause freight trucks now have to travel a 
longer distance to deliver goods.  
Deferred Maintenance Costs  
Taxpayers More in the Long Term
Allowing roads and bridges to deteriorate 
to the point that replacement is necessary 
costs the government more than keeping 
up with ongoing maintenance. According 
to AASHTO:  
• Reconstructing a road after 25 years 
can cost more than triple the amount 
necessary to preserve the road in 
good condition over that same period. 
• The Director of the Michigan De-
partment of Transportation, Kirk T. 
Steudle, said at a news conference 
to release AASHTO’s Rough Roads 
Ahead report, “it costs $1 to keep a 
Additional
Operating
Costs
      
 1 Los Angeles, CA $746 
 2 San Jose, CA  $732 
 3 San Francisco–
  Oakland, CA  $705 
 4 Tulsa, OK  $703 
 5 Honolulu, HI  $688 
 6 San Diego, CA  $664 
 7 Concord, CA  $656 
 8 New York, NY–
  Newark, NJ $638 
 9 Riverside–
  San Bernardino, CA  $632 
 10 Oklahoma City, OK  $631
Rank Metropolitan 
Area
Table 4: Top Ten Metropolitan Areas 
with the Highest Additional Operating 
Costs Due to Rough Roads (Populations 
of 500,000 or more)46
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The Crown Point Bridge
In October 2009, the Crown Point or Champlain Bridge, linking New York and Vermont, was closed after an inspection revealed critical structural problems. The 
estimated 3,500 vehicles that had been using the Crown Point Bridge each day were 
left with an $8 ferry ride or a 100-mile detour. The bridge was demolished two 
months later, on December 28, 2009, and the two states are now planning a replace-
ment structure.48 
When the Crown 
Point Bridge closed, 
travelers had to 
choose between an 
$8 ferry ride or a 
100-mile detour to 
cross between New 
York and Vermont. 
Photo by Jay 
Parker.
Figure 5: Allowing Pavement to Deteriorate Increases Costs52
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road in good shape for every $7 
you would have to spend on  
reconstruction.”  
• The National Pavement Preservation 
Association has found that $1 spent 
on preservation can eliminate or 
delay the need for $6 to $14 for road 
reconstruction. (See Figure 5.)
• Building a new road or bridge re-
quires significantly more material, 
labor, and equipment than repairing 
an existing bridge.
States Spend Billions on  
Expanded Roadway  
Capacity
Catching up with the backlog of necessary 
road and bridge maintenance would cost 
America hundreds of billions of dollars.  
The U.S. Department of Transportation 
estimates that merely maintaining the 
condition and performance of the federal 
highway system would require investing 
more than $100 billion per year—almost 
The Birmingham Bridge
In February 2008, the Birmingham Bridge which crosses the Monongahela River in Pittsburgh had to be closed for just over three weeks after two spans 
moved because of problems with the bridge’s rocker bearings. During the clo-
sure, 23,000 vehicles a day had to find alternate routes.49
Ramps on the Birmingham Bridge fell about 8 inches after a problem with a key 
support mechanism, forcing an extended closure. Photo by Dave Gingrich.
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$30 billion more than current spending 
levels..   The bill for maintaining existing 
bridges in current condition alone would 
reach nearly $18 billion annually.  
The emphasis on repair has increased 
since 1990, when the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 
opened up federal transportation spending 
to uses beyond road building. Neverthe-
less, spending on maintenance and repair 
continues to lag behind actual need.  
States continue to direct large amounts 
of capital into building new roadways and 
expanding existing ones. Since 1985, the 
nation has built more than 130,000 miles 
of roadway—enough to circle the globe 
more than five times.   In 2008, states 
spent more than $15 billion in capital to 
build new roads, reconstruct roads with 
added capacity, or perform major wid-
ening projects.   Of federal capital funds 
committed to specific roadway projects 
by the states in 2008, the Federal High-
way Administration classified 41 percent, 
or almost $7 billion, as going toward ex-
panded capacity.  
In 2009, states committed almost a 
third of their infrastructure funds from 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act—$6.6 billion—to new capacity road 
and bridge projects rather than to repair 
and other preservation projects.   Kentucky 
directed 88 percent of its stimulus funds to 
new roads, rather than fixing the 39 percent 
of its roads that are in poor condition, or its 
573 structurally deficient bridges.   
The emphasis on building new roads 
not only diverts resources that could be 
used for road maintenance and repair—it 
also increases the size of the system, and 
expands the need for road maintenance in 
the future.
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Why are America’s roads and bridg-es in such poor shape? And who is to blame?
In truth, the deterioration of our roads 
and bridges is no accident. Rather, it is the 
direct result of countless policy decisions 
that put other considerations ahead of the 
pressing need to preserve our investment 
in the highway system. Political forces of-
ten undermine a strong commitment to 
maintenance. Members of Congress, state 
legislators and local politicians thrive on 
ribbon-cuttings. Powerful special interests 
push for new and bigger highways. And as 
costs rise, voters are rebelling against pay-
ing higher gas taxes, and demanding that 
transportation agencies make do with the 
resources they have. Meanwhile, federal 
and state policies—which should provide 
strong guidance in the wise use of taxpayer 
dollars—often fail to achieve the proper 
balance between building new infrastruc-
ture and taking care of what we already 
have built. 
In this section of the report, we explore 
the political tendencies that skew spending 
toward construction of new and ever-wid-
er highways at the expense of repair and 
maintenance activity. We also examine the 
state and federal policies that magnify this 
bias and fail to create accountability for 
spending wisely.
Political Pressure Tilts  
the Playing Field  
Toward Construction of  
New Highways
Federal and state transportation officials 
are subject to pressure from elected of-
ficials and special interests, which tends 
to tilt the playing field toward the con-
struction of new and wider highways and 
bridges.
New and wider highways feature high-
profile launches, ribbon cuttings, and 
sometimes are even named after the politi-
cians who secured their funding. They also 
satisfy the powerful interests that make up 
the highway lobby, who often advocate 
for transportation dollars to go to projects 
from which they will benefit. 
Maintenance and repair projects mean-
while address problems that haven’t hap-
pened yet and of which the public generally 
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isn’t yet aware. Maintenance problems 
can typically be deferred into the future, 
when they become somebody else’s prob-
lem. Even worse, the chief public reac-
tion to maintenance projects is likely to 
be displeasure over temporary closure of 
bridges or lanes. 
Transportation Funding Decisions: 
Subject to Special Interest  
Pressure 
The highway lobby—interests that stand 
to profit from federal, state and local ex-
penditures on highway projects—is a 
powerful political force in many states, as 
well as at the federal level. The highway 
lobby includes a diverse array of interests, 
such as automobile companies, oil and 
gas companies, cement and asphalt com-
panies, construction firms, and real estate 
developers.
According to an investigation by the 
Center for Public Integrity, more than 
1,800 different special interest groups are 
vying to influence the contents of the next 
highway authorization bill to follow the 
expiration of the Safe, Accountable, Flex-
ible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: 
A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).   All 
together, these interests are spending tens 
of millions of dollars on 2,100 federal lob-
byists, and many more at the state level.  
According to a U.S. PIRG Education 
Fund analysis, in 2008, highway interests 
gave more than $80 million to candidates 
for federal office and more than $50 mil-
lion to candidates for state office.   In state 
elections, highway and construction inter-
ests outspent the defense industry and the 
energy and natural resources industries.  
According to the Center for Public In-
tegrity, many real estate or construction in-
terests that donate to candidates for office 
often have specific projects in mind that 
they are hoping to advance.   For example, 
a New York developer, Concord Associ-
ates, gave $100,000 to the Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee. That 
same developer benefited from an earmark 
placed in the 2005 transportation authori-
zation bill by Senator Charles Schumer of 
New York to study widening Route 17 to 
the Catskills, where Concord Associates 
is planning a huge mountain resort and 
casino.   Concord Associates also hired a 
former state legislator as a lobbyist, pay-
ing $350,000 in the first year.   Similarly, 
Florida developer Daniel Aronoff held a 
$40,000 fundraiser for House Transporta-
tion Committee Chairman Don Young of 
Alaska. Afterward, Representative Young 
inserted a $10 million earmark for a road 
project in Florida into the language of 
SAFTEA-LU, against the wishes of local 
transportation officials.  
Highway interests often push for new 
capacity projects, which can benefit new 
residential or commercial developments, 
as in the case of Concord Associates. Addi-
tionally, new capacity projects or major re-
construction projects often involve states 
issuing lucrative contracts to construction 
firms. In contrast, ongoing maintenance 
measures have little political constituency. 
Many state DOTs use state employees to 
perform their ongoing maintenance.   
New capacity projects have a well-fi-
nanced and powerful lobby with a large 
profit motive pushing for them, while re-
pair projects do not. If politics is allowed 
large influence over spending decisions, it 
is no surprise that repair and maintenance 
projects will lose out. 
State Departments of  
Transportation Respond to  
Political Influences
Under federal law, states have wide leeway 
in how they may spend federal transporta-
tion dollars when they are directed toward 
highways. Unlike new transit lines pro-
posed under the New Starts program, for 
example, new highway or bridge projects 
do not undergo any rigorous evaluation or 
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prioritization at the federal level.
State decisions about how to spend 
transportation funding are subject to the 
influence of politicians and public pres-
sure. According to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), state trans-
portation agencies tend to weigh political 
support and public opinion more heavily 
than cost-benefit calculations when decid-
ing how to spend federal transportation 
dollars. As a result, state transportation 
agencies can neglect projects—like ongoing 
maintenance—that can extend the life-
time and minimize the life-cycle costs of 
roads and bridges. A GAO official testi-
fied before Congress that “rigorous eco-
nomic analysis does not generally drive 
the investment decisions of state and local 
governments—in a 2004 survey of state 
departments of transportation, 34 of 43 
state departments of transportation cited 
political support and public opinion as 
very important factors, whereas 8 said the 
same of the ratio of benefits to costs.”  
Federal Highway Programs Funding Repair  
and Maintenance 
There are six main federal programs providing funding to the states for high-way transportation activities. Two of those funds are specifically oriented to-
wards preservation and rehabilitation: the Interstate Maintenance Program and 
the Highway Bridge Program. Additionally, funds within the National Highway 
System apportionment or the Surface Transportation Program can be used for 
maintenance—along with a wide variety of other activities, including new road 
construction.72
The Interstate Maintenance Program is primarily directed toward preserving 
the national network of Interstate Highways in good condition. Eligible uses of 
funds include: “resurfacing, restoring, rehabilitating, and reconstructing” Interstate 
routes. Any portion of a project’s cost attributable to new capacity additions other 
than HOV lanes is not eligible for Interstate Maintenance Program funding.73
Funding for the Interstate Maintenance Program is based on equal parts:
•	 Interstate lane miles open to traffic within a state;
•	 Vehicle miles traveled on Interstate routes open to traffic; and
•	 Annual contributions to the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund 
attributable to commercial vehicles.
The Highway Bridge Program provides funding to states to assist with bridge 
maintenance, including “bridge painting, seismic retrofitting, anti-scour measures, 
deicing applications,” and preemptive maintenance to ensure bridges remain struc-
turally sound and safe.74 These activities are allowed on any bridge regardless of 
its condition. Program funds are also intended to help states renovate or replace 
structurally deficient bridges. In addition, states can use program funds to renovate 
(Continued on page 23)
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Federal Policies Fail to 
Counter Inherent Biases 
Against Maintenance
The road and bridge maintenance crisis 
begins at the top. Federal transportation 
policies fail to counter the inherent biases 
against maintenance introduced by the na-
ture of our political system—and in some 
cases, actually magnify it. 
Lack of Prioritization
As currently formulated, federal policy 
does not lay out a broad vision or over-
all goal for the preservation of the system. 
Rather, each individual state decides how 
to spend transportation dollars, including 
decisions on what bridges or highways to 
repair and when. The federal government 
gives billions in funds eligible for mainte-
nance to states every year, but allows states 
or replace functionally obsolete bridges—which could include rebuilding a bridge 
to include more lanes. 75 
Funding for the Highway Bridge Program is based on:
•	 Relative state share of the total cost to repair or replace deficient highway 
bridges nationwide.
National Highway System funds go toward a wide variety of maintenance, re-
habilitation, replacement, expansion, construction or related projects on the Na-
tional Highway System, which includes the Interstate System and other major 
metropolitan and rural highways.76
Funding for the National Highway System is based on:
•	 Lane miles on non-Interstate arterial roads (25 percent);
•	 Lane miles on those roads, divided by total state population (10 percent);
•	 Vehicle miles traveled on those roads (35 percent);
•	 Diesel fuel used on highways (30 percent).
The Surface Transportation Program provides funding for a wide variety of 
maintenance, rehabilitation, replacement, expansion, construction or related 
projects on any road eligible for federal funding, or for transit capital projects.77
Funding for the Surface Transportation Program is based on:
•	 Lane miles on non-Interstate arterial roads (25 percent);
•	 Lane miles on those roads, divided by total state population (10 percent);
•	 Vehicle miles traveled on those roads (35 percent);
•	 Diesel fuel used on highways (30 percent).
(Continued from page 22)
Why Are America’s Roads and Bridges in Such Poor Shape? 23
to divert much of that funding to other 
purposes while failing to tie funding to 
any concrete outcome.
Federal transportation policy has been 
oriented toward providing maximum flex-
ibility to the states, and toward ensur-
ing that federal transportation funding is 
spread broadly across geographic areas. 
This policy has had the effect of empow-
ering local and state officials to make de-
cisions about their transportation future. 
While it would be inappropriate for the 
federal government to micromanage state 
decisions, federal taxpayers deserve to 
have safeguards in place to prevent poli-
tics from systematically distorting spend-
ing decisions in a way that undermines the 
long-term health of the system they pay for.
Funding Decisions Not Based on Need
Federal highway programs largely dole 
out money to states based on standard-
ized funding formulas. Formulas for 
highway funding distribution tend to be 
based on criteria including the number of 
lane-miles of roadway within a state, ve-
hicle miles traveled, and contributions of 
commercial vehicle users to the Highway 
Trust Fund. (See “Federal Highway Pro-
grams Funding Repair and Maintenance” 
on page 22.)
As a result, funding distribution some-
times has little relationship to needs or 
to the achievement of key goals, includ-
ing system maintenance. The Interstate 
Maintenance Program is a case in point. 
Were federal monies for Interstate main-
tenance distributed based on need, one 
would assume that states with older road-
ways, or those with worse weather condi-
tions, would receive proportionally more 
funding than states with newer roadways 
or milder climates. Current federal fund-
ing formulas, however, do not take these 
factors into consideration.
For example, in 2007, 567 miles of New 
York’s Interstate Highways were in poor, 
mediocre, or fair condition. New York 
has a large amount of vehicle traffic, older 
roadways, and relatively harsh winters—
all of which contribute to roadway disre-
pair. In contrast, Florida had only 13 miles 
of Interstate highways in poor, mediocre, 
or fair condition.   As a rapidly growing 
state, many of Florida’s roadways are rela-
tively new. Moreover Florida’s weather is 
relatively mild, without the winter freeze-
thaw cycles that can create and expand 
potholes. Yet, because of New York and 
Florida’s similar number of Interstate lane 
miles, both states received about the same 
amount of Interstate Maintenance Pro-
gram funding over the last five years—
$182 million for New York and $193 mil-
lion for Florida, annually.  
In addition, federal law requires that 
states receive roughly similar distribution 
of federal gas tax revenue—regardless of 
the status of states’ transportation infra-
structure or investment needs. Under cur-
rent law, states get a minimum of 92 per-
cent of the funds they contribute through 
federal gas taxes back in transportation 
funding, regardless of whether those states 
have projects worth funding. This guaran-
tee is achieved through the Equity Bonus 
Program.   Money apportioned to states 
through the Equity Bonus Program can 
be essentially used for any purpose, with 
no prioritization. More than 20 percent of 
the funding authorized under SAFETEA-
LU—$40 billion over five years—was allo-
cated through the Equity Bonus Program.  
Thankfully, in some cases, as with the 
Highway Bridge Program, transportation 
funding is based on a measure of need. The 
Highway Bridge Program allocates avail-
able resources to states for bridge mainte-
nance based on the cost to repair all defi-
cient bridges in a state relative to the total 
such cost nationwide.  In fiscal year 2009, 
the highway bridge program apportioned 
$5.3 billion to the states.   Delaware, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, 
and Wyoming, the states with the low-
est share of the nationwide cost to repair 
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structurally deficient bridges, each were 
apportioned between $12 million and $14 
million. Pennsylvania, New York, and 
California, the states with the most struc-
turally deficient and functionally obsolete 
bridges, each were apportioned between 
$490 million and $510 million.  
However, in the case of the Highway 
Bridge Program, the ability to “flex” funds 
from bridge maintenance to other needs 
actually creates a disincentive to keep 
bridges in good repair, because reducing 
the bridge repair backlog could result in 
reduced Bridge Program funding in fu-
ture years. (See the following section on 
page 25 for a detailed discussion of flexible 
funding.)
Consider a state which uses its Bridge 
Program funding to repair structurally de-
ficient bridges. In the following year, that 
state will likely have a smaller backlog of 
bridge work to be done—and thus will 
receive a smaller fraction of the pool of 
money distributed through the program. 
In contrast, if the state chose to shift a por-
tion of Bridge Program funding to other 
needs, it could result in the state getting a 
greater baseline share of Highway Bridge 
Program money in the following year, 
because it would face greater costs to fix 
its deficient bridges. This perverse incen-
tive also discourages states from directing 
other sources of federal or state funding 
toward bridge repair.  
Flexible Funding Without Accountability 
for Results Undercuts Maintenance
If the federal government were to choose 
to prioritize maintenance of the existing 
system, the most obvious way to do so 
would be to boost funding for programs 
specifically aimed at maintaining the cur-
rent system, such as the Interstate Mainte-
nance Program and the Highway Bridge 
Program. However, the flexibility given 
to states with regard to the allocation of 
maintenance funds already undercuts feder-
al efforts to encourage proper maintenance. 
The availability of two methods to trans-
fer funds between programs—one official 
and one unofficial—reduces the amount 
of funds specifically dedicated to main-
tenance. Between 2005 and 2007, states 
overall spent only 9 of every 10 dollars 
apportioned for the Highway Bridge Pro-
gram, transferring the other 10 percent to 
other purposes. Minnesota, Arkansas, and 
Arizona spent the least amount of their 
available Bridge Program funds, spending 
54 percent, 46 percent, and 45 percent less 
than their full apportionments, respective-
ly, over this three-year period.   In com-
parison, in fiscal year 2006, states overall 
spent 113 percent of the apportionment 
for the National Highway System and 132 
percent of the apportionment for the Sur-
face Transportation Program—the two 
most flexible highway programs and the 
ones most often used for highway con-
struction.  
In 2008, the federal government di-
rected 28 percent of all highway trans-
portation funds apportioned to the states 
to the Highway Bridge Program and the 
Interstate Maintenance Program, the two 
programs most directly oriented towards 
system preservation rather than system 
expansion.   However, because of the large 
degree of flexibility afforded under these 
programs, the amount of funding actually 
used for repair or maintenance could end 
up being much less.
Under the Highway Bridge Program, 
states can decide how to prioritize the use 
of the funds. The program is intended 
to address both structurally deficient and 
functionally obsolete bridges, with no 
guidance on which to prioritize. Theoreti-
cally, a state could use the money to fo-
cus exclusively on expanding functionally 
obsolete bridges to increase traffic speeds 
rather than performing preventative main-
tenance or repair of existing structural 
problems. 
Moreover, the Highway Bridge Pro-
gram allows states to shift federal money 
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intended for maintenance to other proj-
ects—including the construction of new 
roads and bridges—regardless of the con-
dition of a state’s existing roads and bridg-
es. Federal policy allows states to transfer 
up to 50 percent of Interstate Mainte-
nance Program funds or Highway Bridge 
Program funds to broader programs that 
allow for spending on new construction, 
such as the Surface Transportation Pro-
gram.   (See Figure 6.) While the law in-
cludes a penalty intended to deter states 
from diverting Highway Bridge Program 
funds to other uses, the penalty for doing 
so could be entirely offset by funds from 
the Equity Bonus Program.   No compa-
rable penalty exists in the Interstate Main-
tenance Program.  
According to the Federal Highway 
Administration and the Government Ac-
countability Office, 27 states transferred 
$2.8 billion (or 7 percent) of Highway 
Bridge Program funds to other projects 
from 1998 through 2006.   From fiscal year 
2003 to 2007, several states transferred 
more than $50 million in Highway Bridge 
Program funding to other programs: 
Rhode Island ($50 million), Minnesota 
National Highway
System (NHS)
Surface
Transportation
Program (STP)
Interstate
Maintenance
Program (IM)
Highway Bridge
Replacement and
Rehabilitation
Program (HBRRP)
Highway Safety
Improvement
Program (HSIP)
Congestion
Mitigation &
Air Quality
Improvement
Program (CMAQ)
With certain restrictions, up to 50% of apportioned funds may be transferreda
CMAQ funds may be transferred if a minimum threshold is metb
100% of NHS funds may be transferred to the STP program if the Secretary
of Transportation approves the transfer and a sufficient public comment
period is providedc
Figure 6 : Transferability of Transportation Program Funds95
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($51 million), Ohio ($87 million), Cali-
fornia ($306 million), and Pennsylvania 
($972 million).  
Finally, because of the complicated ac-
counting around the distribution of fund-
ing to highway programs, states have flex-
ibility to spend much less than their full 
apportionment on a given highway pro-
gram, effectively shifting funds to another 
highway program without making an of-
ficial transfer.   Historically, states have 
tended to use this fact to spend less than 
allowed on maintenance-oriented pro-
grams and more on the most flexible pro-
grams that allow activities including system 
expansion.  
In principle, flexible funding can also 
work the other way, enabling states to 
shift money that could be used for the 
construction of new infrastructure toward 
maintenance instead. As noted earlier (see 
page 20, however, states face strong incen-
tives to invest in new roads and bridges at 
the expense of routine maintenance.
No Prioritization Exists Within Programs
Even within programs, there is no way 
for the federal government to prioritize 
particular projects with greater national 
significance. The lack of prioritization has 
two impacts. First, it makes it more dif-
ficult to direct funds to important projects 
that are expensive and difficult—for exam-
ple, the maintenance or reconstruction of 
a critical bridge with high traffic loads in 
a congested metropolitan area—projects 
that states will have incentives to put off as 
long as possible. Second, to the extent that 
the lack of objective criteria for evaluating 
transportation investments makes it easier 
for states to build new highways of dubi-
ous merit, it further adds to states’ incen-
tives to pursue system expansion, even at 
the expense of maintenance.
Not every federal transportation pro-
gram works this way. The Federal Transit 
Administration’s New Starts program is a 
competitive grant program that requires 
that proposed new transit projects be jus-
tified according to a host of clearly defined 
criteria. No such criteria, however, exist 
for states’ use of broader transportation 
funds, making it easier for states to invest 
in new capacity, regardless of whether 
those investments are the wisest use of 
federal dollars.
Without similarly clear funding cri-
teria, spending for the most needed road 
and bridge projects are often skewed to-
ward projects that will spread the money 
around more or to indirectly expand the 
number of lanes and highway miles.
In its 2008 report on the Highway 
Bridge Program (HBP), the Government 
Accountability Office noted that the larg-
est, most heavily traveled deficient bridges 
can be particularly expensive to fix—with 
costs far exceeding the amount of funds 
available through the Highway Bridge 
Program. According to GAO, “transpor-
tation officials in Washington state and 
other states we visited acknowledged that 
bridge mega projects such as these could 
easily exhaust a state’s entire HBP appor-
tionment for many years, potentially to 
the detriment of all other bridge needs 
in that state.”   When states do decide to 
repair large, heavily traveled, costly spans, 
they must often look to other sources of 
funding outside of the Highway Bridge 
Program to make these projects happen—
either earmarks or special state programs.   
In addition, the inability to prioritize 
projects—particularly those related to 
highway or bridge expansion—can also 
make it easier for states to invest in new 
capacity projects of limited merit. The 
Highway Bridge Program also provides a 
good example in this regard. By dedicating 
funds toward both structurally deficient 
and functionally obsolete bridges at the 
same time, the program fails to provide di-
rection to the states in achieving national 
goals for system preservation. While one 
state might prioritize maintenance of the 
most critical links in its transportation 
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system, another might prioritize recon-
structing bridges to enable them to handle 
more traffic. 
The attempts that have been made to 
identify and fund priority projects have 
largely fizzled. For example, in SAF-
ETEA-LU, Congress made an attempt 
to provide funding for specific national 
priorities, chosen by the Department of 
Transportation based on a competitive 
application process and a defined set of 
evaluation criteria. However, members of 
Congress directed all of the $1.8 billion in 
available funds to specific projects identi-
fied in the legislation, bypassing any com-
petitive application process. (See this page 
for further discussion of such “earmark-
ing” of funds.)
No Accountability for  
Performance
Even if America’s highway policy focused 
resources toward national priorities and 
goals for preserving roads and bridges in a 
state of good repair, federal funds are now 
given out with no accountability for actu-
ally achieving specific outcomes. None of 
the major highway programs include re-
quirements that money spent deliver any 
particular measurable result or perfor-
mance benchmark.
The only accountability measure aimed 
at infrastructure preservation in SAF-
ETEA-LU allows the U.S. Transporta-
tion Secretary to withhold funding for 
states that fail to properly maintain roads 
and bridges that were built using federal 
funds.   However, the law remains tooth-
less because it does not define what proper 
maintenance is—and the authors of this 
report were unable to find an instance of 
its use.   Currently, the law requires the 
Federal Highway Administration to notify 
a state if it believes the roads and bridges 
are not properly maintained and give the 
state 90 days to correct the condition. A 
similar accountability mechanism in previous 
federal transportation laws—which autho-
rized sanctions against states that could not 
certify that federal-aid highways and bridges 
were properly maintained—was rarely used. 
Congressional Earmarks Further 
Tilt Spending Away from  
Maintenance
Congressional earmarks—in which mem-
bers of Congress bypass the administrative 
process of allocating merit-based funding 
and instead designate funding for specific 
projects—further tilt spending away from 
system preservation and maintenance.
In the last transportation authoriza-
tion bill (SAFETEA-LU), there were al-
most 6,000 earmarks totaling more than 
$13 billion.   The most notorious of these 
earmarks designated $223 million for the 
“Bridge to Nowhere” between Ketchikan 
and Gravina Island in Alaska—which was 
raised as a major issue in congressional 
campaigns in 2006 and 2008, and in the 
2008 presidential race.   The primary ben-
eficiaries of the project would have been 
the 7,000 residents of the Island, and the 
contractors put to work on the project.   
The Bridge to Nowhere was never 
built. However, this earmark and others 
carved out $100 million annually from the 
Highway Bridge Program for new bridge 
construction—a use of funds that normally 
would not be allowed.  
The funding for some programs au-
thorized by SAFETEA-LU was 100 per-
cent earmarked. For example, the 2005 
transportation bill created a five-year, 
$1.8 billion program intended to iden-
tify and fund transportation projects of 
“national and regional significance.” The 
program included a wide variety of crite-
ria intended to prioritize projects based 
on their importance for the functioning 
of the transportation system nationwide. 
However, according to a report by the 
Bipartisan Policy Center, the winners of the 
grants were already predetermined in the 
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Poor Inspection and Data Reporting –
A Symptom of the Lack of National Priorities and Goals
In its 2008 bridge report, the Government Accountability Office noted that evaluating the impact of the Highway Bridge Program was difficult to impossible.103 The lack of clear focus on mea-
surable indicators and performance indicators means a lack of workable data. For example:104
•	 The Federal Highway Administration keeps track of federal capital spending on bridges—
which may be for repairs or for expanding traffic volume—but the numbers do not include 
money spent on preventative maintenance, because it does not count as a capital expenditure. 
•	 No agency keeps track of comprehensive spending on bridges at the state and local level, 
making it difficult to evaluate the impact of federal spending, or the extent to which states 
respond to increased federal funding availability by reducing state and local spending.
•	 Neither the Federal Highway Administration nor state departments of transportation keep 
track of comprehensive, quantifiable measures of the performance and outcomes of spend-
ing through the Highway Bridge Program.
•	 The National Bridge Inventory makes it difficult to track changes in the condition of a 
bridge over time. The identifying numbers of the bridges are assigned by state DOTs and 
do not remain constant. “As a result,” the GAO noted, “it is difficult to track changes in the 
condition of any specific bridge or group of bridges to determine if, for example, the same 
bridges that were deficient in 1998 are still deficient today, to see how many bridges have 
been replaced, or to determine the impact of new bridges added to the inventory (which 
may not be funded by the HBP) on the overall condition of the nation’s bridges.” 105
The failure to orient the program toward accountability and performance extends even into the 
process for bridge inspection and condition reporting:
•	 States are often not fully aware of the extent and degree of bridge disrepair. Many bridges 
are inspected only visually and only every two years. Speaking about a bill to reform the 
Highway Bridge Program, Congressman James Oberstar reported that “these visual in-
spections are subjective and can vary” because there are no uniform standards nor training 
requirements for bridge inspectors.106
•	 Furthermore, since 10 percent of structurally deficient bridges in the National Highway 
System are incorrectly load-rated, and increased load weights exacerbate the structural 
deficiencies of bridges, states are often unaware the rate of which their bridges are actually 
losing structural integrity.107
The nation’s highway programs need a clearer focus and an orientation toward achieving particu-
lar national priorities and goals, with measureable outcomes, in order to ensure that transporta-
tion dollars are being spent in the most effective ways possible.
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text of the legislation. Members of Congress 
earmarked every dollar available to projects 
they deemed of importance to their districts, 
bypassing any national prioritization.  
Members of Congress also earmark 
funds in the annual bill that appropriates 
funding for transportation programs. In 
2008, just a few months after the tragic 
Minneapolis bridge collapse which killed 
13 and sparked alarm and outrage across 
the country, Congress directed only 74 of 
the 704 highway projects earmarked in the 
annual transportation appropriations bill 
to repair or maintain a bridge, tunnel or 
overpass.   In other words, only about one 
in 10 of the projects, and about 10 per-
cent of the funding, focused on fixing the 
nation’s crumbling bridge infrastructure. 
The delegation from Mississippi, for in-
stance, secured funding for 19 earmarked 
projects at a cost of $29 million, and de-
spite having a backlog of over 3,000 struc-
turally-deficient bridges in the state, none 
of their earmarks went to bridge repair. 
The majority of the $570 million went for 
new highways and construction of other 
new highway capacity.   
State Policies Can Further 
Steer Spending Away from 
Adequate Maintenance
State policies can aggravate the imbalance 
in highway spending, failing to counter 
the inherent bias toward building new ca-
pacity and other politically high-profile 
projects. In particular, some states distrib-
ute highway dollars based on geography 
or political equity, rather than by prioriti-
zation based on objective criteria designed 
to achieve state and national goals. States 
also have a tendency to classify some road 
expansion projects as repair work, making 
accountability more difficult.
Distributing Funding Based on 
Geography Undercuts  
Statewide Priorities 
In many states, state departments of trans-
portation tend to under-invest in met-
ropolitan areas, where road and bridge 
maintenance and repair needs are often 
the greatest. Transportation spending de-
cisions are often skewed by formulas or de-
cisions that spread funding around based 
on geography rather than need—a pattern 
aggravated in cases where metropolitan 
areas are politically underrepresented.
For example, Georgia divides up to 85 
percent of its transportation dollars by 
congressional district, but exempts money 
for certain programs, such as a program 
to build four-lane highways in rural parts 
of the state.   The Atlanta Journal Consti-
tution calculated in 2003 that this formula 
leads the state to spend 50 percent more 
per capita on areas outside metropolitan 
Atlanta than inside.   The Atlanta Re-
gional Commission estimated in the late 
1990s that metropolitan Atlanta generated 
40 percent of the state’s gas tax revenues, 
but received just 17 percent of total state 
transportation dollars.   Georgia’s highway 
system in metropolitan areas has 117 miles 
of rough roads, while the highway system 
in rural areas has 14 miles of rough roads.  
Regardless of distributional issues be-
tween Atlanta and the rest of the state, 
dividing funding by congressional district 
clearly has little to do with actual spend-
ing needs. This practice prevents the state 
from prioritizing the most important 
transportation projects for the state as a 
whole.
North Carolina has a similar “equity” 
formula that weakens efforts to prioritize 
transportation spending. Under a 1989 law, 
the state distributes Highway Trust Fund 
dollars to seven different regions of the 
state, with 25 percent allocated as an equal 
share between areas, 25 percent to build 
a system of 4-lane “intrastate” highways, 
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and 50 percent based on regional share of 
the state’s total population.   The law was 
intended to stimulate economic growth in 
rural areas of the state.  
In metropolitan areas, politicians and 
residents have complained that the for-
mula reflects the power of rural politicians 
and under-serves the needs of the most 
highly populated and economically pro-
ductive centers in the state.   Compound-
ing the problem, residents are counted by 
where they live, and not where they drive.  
Blurring the Definition Between 
“Maintenance” and Highway 
Expansion 
State policies often expand the defini-
tion of “maintenance” projects to include 
road or bridge expansion, further reduc-
ing the amount of money available for 
“true” maintenance. Part of the problem 
is that state DOT officials frequently lump 
structural and maintenance problems in 
together with road or bridge features that 
Some States Focus Federal Highway Funding on 
Bridge Repair while Others Emphasize New Capacity
The amount of federal funding going to repair structurally deficient bridges var-ies wildly from metro area to metro area and state to state. (See the appendix 
on page 44 for detailed tables.) For example, Texas spends more than 30 times the 
amount of funding per square foot of structurally deficient bridge in the Houston 
metropolitan area as California spends in the Sacramento metropolitan area.123
Similarly, the degree to which states prioritize using federal resources for 
bridge repair relative to building new highway capacity varies dramatically from 
state to state. Nevada and Delaware, two of the states with the smallest amount 
of structurally deficient bridges, spent more than 10 times the amount of federal 
funding per square foot of structurally deficient bridge area from 2006 to 2008 
than states like Rhode Island, Iowa, Arkansas, Kentucky and California. (See the 
appendix on page 44 for a detailed table.) On average, states spent $17.42 in 
federal funding per square foot of structurally deficient bridge annually over this 
period, for a total of $4.8 billion per year. This compares with $8.2 billion per 
year to expand or build new highways.124
Over this period, 13 states—including Massachusetts, New Jersey and Missis-
sippi—spent less on new capacity than bridge repair. In contrast, 25 states spent 
more than double the amount of federal dollars on new highway capacity than on 
bridge repair. Kentucky, Nevada and Arkansas spent more than five times more 
on new capacity than bridge repair, and Florida, Hawaii and Arizona spent more 
than 10 times more on new capacity than bridge repair.
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merely do not allow traffic to flow as fast 
as would newly designed construction. As 
a result, some “repair” projects construct 
additional lanes or other new infrastructure.
Interstate 94 in Wisconsin provides a 
good example. Wisconsin is devoting $1.9 
billion, including $200 million in federal 
stimulus funds, to replace deteriorating 
pavement on the 38-mile section of 
Interstate 94 between Milwaukee and 
the Illinois border. However, the state 
decided to expand the scope of the project 
to include widening the Interstate from 
four to eight lanes.   All bridges on the 38 
mile stretch are scheduled to be replaced 
to accommodate the four additional lanes, 
despite the fact that only one of them is 
structurally deficient.   According to the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
the reconstruction would cost $1.4 billion 
with no added lanes; $1.7 billion with two 
added lanes (which the state calls “Safety 
and Design Improvements,”); and $1.9 
billion for four added lanes.   However, 
given the fact that most of the bridges 
would not need reconstruction without 
the added lanes on I-94, the state appears 
to be underestimating the cost of the 
added capacity and labeling much of the 
expenditure as repair.
How Traffic Engineering Exacerbates the Problem
Transportation planners have long engineered traffic systems to funnel traffic onto large roads and expressways rather than fully utilizing networks of local 
roads.133 The idea is to get “through traffic” off of local streets, which is intended 
to benefit the quality of life of local residents. But channeling ever more traffic 
onto fewer—and larger—roadways, has significant costs and federal and state poli-
cies often exacerbate those costs.
States tend to evaluate roadway projects in isolation from one another, with 
each improvement standing on its own merit, regardless of how combinations of 
improvements might perform together. This type of evaluation tends to empha-
size adding new lanes or widening an intersection—and leaving local road net-
works under-utilized. Aggravating the issue, federal policy instructs states to use 
federal highway aid largely on major roadways, restricting the use of the dollars 
on local road networks.134
As a result, many states invest most of their federal dollars in highway capac-
ity designed to handle peak commuter traffic and long distance travel. However, 
most trips in metropolitan America are short trips, and mostly non-work trips. 
And, most of the roadway capacity in America is in local road networks.135 To the 
extent state departments of transportation fail to recognize the capacity of local 
road networks to move traffic and mischaracterize the nature of citizen and freight 
transportation use of roadways, officials can over-emphasize investment in major 
roadways.
This can tend to increase vehicle miles traveled and aggravate the impacts of 
traffic and heavy use on roadways—particularly in areas that collect large numbers 
of vehicles—increasing the need for regular roadway maintenance.
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The Wisconsin DOT claims that ex-
panding the freeway will relieve conges-
tion for commuters in Wisconsin’s south-
eastern counties.   In actuality, congestion 
outside Milwaukee is minimal.   Even as-
suming DOT’s projection that congestion 
will worsen by 2035, there is only one 
stretch of road (I-94 northbound, south of 
Route 50) that will have “extreme conges-
tion” if lanes are not added.   However, this 
projected congestion is much contested 
because of alternate plans to construct a 
commuter train link.  
Unlike structurally deficient bridges 
and rough and corroded roads, “func-
tionally obsolete” roadways often do not 
pose a safety problem. Fixing these design 
problems may just displace traffic bottle-
necks to further down the road. Further-
more, some kinds of road improvements 
that increase the speed of traffic also make 
driving more lethal.   Technically, obsolete 
road design may play a useful function by 
calming traffic and keeping drivers’ atten-
tion, even if they encourage lower operat-
ing speeds.
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America’s failure to maintain its roads and bridges has many causes. From political pressures that disfavor re-
pair or maintenance, to state and federal 
policies that fail to prioritize maintenance 
and fail to hold states accountable, there is 
plenty of blame to go around.
Fixing America’s roads and bridges, 
therefore, will require more than just 
spending more money on transportation. 
It requires a top-to-bottom shift in the 
nation’s transportation funding priorities 
and policies. 
Many transportation experts argue that 
America should adopt a “Fix it First” ap-
proach to investment in our road and 
bridge infrastructure.   The most fiscally 
prudent way to manage our transporta-
tion system is to make sure that struc-
tural and safety problems get addressed 
in a timely way—before roads or bridges 
must be closed or catastrophe strikes. We 
must recognize that the post-World War 
II highway-building boom is over, and we 
have entered a new era. Investments in 
new and ever larger highways are inconsis-
tent with a transportation future in which 
more resources will be needed for mainte-
nance and for rounding out the network 
with public transportation, intercity rail 
and other transportation options.
What steps are necessary to hold gov-
ernment accountable for ensuring our 
roads and bridges are maintained in good 
repair, and that any such policy has real 
teeth?
First, it means that system maintenance 
must become a top priority for highway 
programs in the years to come.
Second, national transportation pro-
grams for improving the state of good 
repair must link spending to measureable 
outcomes. Federal policy should ensure 
that every transportation dollar delivers 
the greatest impact. If states seeking ad-
ditional highway funds must demonstrate 
progress in actually achieving a good state 
of repair, then it will become less of a 
problem to ensure that states prioritize re-
pair and maintenance.
Third, it means that proposals for new 
or expanded highways or bridges must 
be evaluated on criteria based on need. A 
repair- and maintenance-oriented policy 
does not mean that no new highways will 
ever be built or bridges expanded—indeed, 
in some parts of the country, expansion 
projects may well be warranted. Rather, 
Fix It First:  
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it means that if the federal government 
is to prioritize repair and maintenance of 
roads, then states will need to pare their 
“wish lists” for expansion until they dem-
onstrate that a good state of repair. Doing 
so will also save tremendously on future 
transportation costs. 
Fourth, it means that provisions must 
be made—at both the federal and state 
levels—to fund the most urgent and im-
portant projects first, guided by national 
goals and objective criteria. While states 
can take pride in reducing the sheer num-
ber of structurally deficient bridges, it is 
more important to reduce the number of 
people who travel over structurally defi-
cient bridges and roads each day, and to 
address the most pressing problems be-
fore they force the prolonged closure of 
highways or bridges, especially in highly 
populated areas. 
Policy Recommendations
To implement a “Fix it First” vision, the 
federal government should:
•	 Prioritize highway and bridge 
maintenance and repair. Trans-
portation infrastructure is crucial 
to the function of local, state and 
national economies. Accordingly, it 
is in the interest of the country as a 
whole that states take excellent care 
of these assets and maximize their 
value. States should be held account-
able for properly maintaining roads 
and bridges, and should be required 
to demonstrate progress to the public 
according to specific, measurable 
benchmarks. 
•	 Reorganize federal highway pro-
grams. Federal highway programs 
should have a sharper focus, oriented 
toward the achievement of specific 
national priorities and goals with 
measureable outcomes.
•	 Create a highway program 
specifically focused on all 
projects that would increase 
road capacity. This program 
should ensure that new high-
way or bridge projects undergo 
rigorous evaluation and prioriti-
zation at the federal level—much 
like the New Starts program for 
public transportation projects.  
•	 Consolidate programs aimed 
at repair and maintenance into 
one focused program. The 
Prioritizing Repair Can Create Jobs
Investing in repair can create jobs and economic activity. Repair and maintenance projects on roads and bridges produce on average of 16 percent more jobs than 
new highway construction per dollar spent, in part because a greater share of proj-
ect costs go directly into workers’ pockets, and less to right-of-way purchase, en-
gineering, and impact studies.139 Every $1 billion invested in bridge repair creates 
more than 20,000 jobs.140
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federal government should es-
tablish a highway program aimed 
at existing asset management 
to better dedicate resources to 
repair and maintenance. An ex-
ample of how not to do this is the 
Highway Bridge Program, which 
muddles its focus by simultane-
ously directing funding towards 
the divergent priorities of 
preventative maintenance, repair 
of structurally deficient spans, 
and replacement of functionally 
obsolete spans—with no goals or 
accountability for performance. 
Instead, states should prepare 
annual asset management plans 
to target the most important 
projects.
•	 Require states receiving federal 
aid to plan for future maintenance 
of the new roads they build. States 
receiving federal transportation funds 
should calculate and publicly report 
the 10-, 20- and 50-year maintenance 
costs of all new or improved infra-
structure projects and develop a plan 
demonstrating that such funds will 
be available over the lifespan of the 
infrastructure. Such requirements are 
commonplace in state applications 
for federal transit investments such as 
for the New Starts program, which 
must demonstrate where future 
operating funds will come from as a 
condition for eligibility.
•	 Measure performance the right 
way. The federal government should 
establish performance measures con-
nected to national goals that drive in-
vestment decisions. These standards 
could include, for example, annual 
reduction in number of fatalities or 
accidents, the fraction of roadways 
in good condition, the deck area of 
structurally deficient bridges or the 
number of vehicles traveling over 
structurally deficient bridges. If goals 
and performance criteria are to be 
taken seriously for determining al-
location of resources, then standards 
must be well established and reported 
publicly on an annual basis. Federal 
funding should ensure uniform stan-
dards for assessing infrastructure and 
training inspectors. The independent 
source of these funds will ensure 
that states do not underfund inspec-
tion and that inspectors need not be 
concerned about retaining their jobs 
after identifying bad news for their 
employers.
States Adopting “Fix it First” Policies
“Fix it First” policies work to get the most out of established infrastructure in exist-
ing communities—including roads, schools, utilities, and housing—by maintaining 
it in good condition before investing in new projects. 
At least 17 states have adopted “Fix it First” policies, while other states have 
designated priority funding areas or set targets for infrastructure investments to 
meet state-specific goals.137 For example, New Jersey’s “Fix it First” policy, cre-
ated in 2000, required transportation agencies to halve the amount of decaying 
infrastructure in five years. In 2003, then-Governor McGreevey strengthened this 
commitment by issuing an Executive Order to expedite “Fix it First” projects.138
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•	 Reward states for good perfor-
mance on national objectives. 
States already receive bond ratings 
for how well they act to meet future 
obligations to investors who buy their 
assets. By that same principle, the 
U.S. DOT could develop a system to 
rate states based on their progress, or 
lack thereof, on preventative main-
tenance, deferred maintenance, and 
resources dedicated to repair. States 
with unsatisfactory ratings would be 
prohibited from transferring funds 
out of federal repair programs for 
other purposes, and would risk losing 
their full federal funding over time.
To implement a Fix it First vision, state 
and local governments should:
•	 Adopt Fix it First policies. All states 
should adopt Fix it First policies 
analogous to those in Maryland, New 
Jersey and Illinois. For example, in 
1999, Illinois passed Illinois FIRST 
(a Fund for Infrastructure, Roads, 
Schools and Transit)—a five-year, 
$12 billion program to restore aging 
roads and bridges, revitalize mass 
transit, repair suburban schools, clean 
up urban brownfields, upgrade water 
and sewer systems and improve qual-
ity of life throughout the state. Spe-
cifically, these policies should require 
state departments of transportation 
to focus on the rehabilitation of exist-
ing transportation facilities before 
turning attention to the construction 
of new highways. 
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Alabama 0% 1% 1% 13% 86% 14% 2
Alaska 9% 27% 35% 40% 25% 75% 50
Arizona 1% 4% 5% 25% 69% 31% 15
Arkansas 1% 5% 6% 50% 43% 57% 21
California 11% 17% 28% 49% 24% 76% 46
Colorado 2% 8% 10% 49% 41% 59% 29
Connecticut 5% 11% 16% 58% 26% 74% 39
Delaware 4% 3% 7% 41% 52% 48% 23
Dist. of Columbia 65% 24% 89% 11% 0% 100% n/a
Florida 0% 1% 1% 15% 84% 16% 3
Georgia 0% 0% 0% 5% 95% 5% 1
Hawaii 10% 16% 26% 64% 10% 90% 44
Idaho 1% 4% 4% 30% 66% 34% 13
Illinois 4% 13% 17% 40% 43% 57% 41
Indiana 2% 6% 8% 34% 58% 42% 26
Iowa 4% 8% 12% 41% 47% 53% 34
Kansas 1% 3% 3% 26% 71% 29% 8
Kentucky 1% 3% 3% 35% 62% 38% 7
Louisiana 7% 16% 23% 33% 44% 56% 43
Maine 3% 7% 10% 33% 58% 42% 30
Maryland 8% 6% 14% 27% 59% 41% 37
Massachusetts 10% 16% 26% 45% 29% 71% 45
Michigan 6% 8% 14% 25% 62% 38% 36
Minnesota 2% 7% 8% 36% 56% 44% 27
Mississippi 4% 14% 17% 40% 43% 57% 42
Missouri 1% 3% 4% 49% 47% 53% 10
Montana 0% 1% 2% 20% 78% 22% 4
Nebraska   1% 5% 6% 33% 61% 39% 20
Nevada 1% 1% 2% 9% 89% 11% 5
New Hampshire 4% 5% 9% 24% 66% 34% 28
Table A-1: Road Roughness by State, 2008 (Includes Arterial Routes, such as Inter-
states, Freeways, and Other Major Roads)142
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New Jersey 16% 17% 33% 49% 18% 82% 48
New Mexico 1% 4% 6% 26% 69% 31% 18
New York 10% 6% 16% 39% 45% 55% 40
North Carolina 1% 4% 5% 37% 58% 42% 16
North Dakota 1% 3% 4% 33% 63% 37% 12
Ohio 3% 8% 10% 30% 60% 40% 31
Oklahoma 4% 9% 12% 40% 47% 53% 35
Oregon 1% 3% 4% 39% 56% 44% 11
Pennsylvania 2% 8% 10% 47% 43% 57% 32
Rhode Island 13% 22% 34% 50% 16% 84% 49
South Carolina 1% 3% 4% 38% 58% 42% 9
South Dakota 3% 12% 14% 31% 55% 45% 38
Tennessee 1% 2% 3% 18% 79% 21% 6
Texas 2% 5% 7% 45% 48% 52% 24
Utah 1% 6% 6% 44% 49% 51% 22
Vermont 13% 16% 28% 34% 37% 63% 47
Virginia 1% 4% 6% 45% 49% 51% 17
Washington 5% 7% 12% 37% 51% 49% 33
West Virginia 2% 4% 6% 45% 49% 51% 19
Wisconsin 2% 6% 8% 35% 57% 43% 25
Wyoming 1% 4% 5% 38% 57% 43% 14
U.S. Total 3% 7% 10% 35% 55% 45% n/a
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Table A-1: (continued)
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Alabama 1,686 11% 4%
Alaska 129 11% 8%
Arizona 210 3% 4%
Arkansas 933 7% 7%
California 3,228 13% 19%
Colorado 598 7% 7%
Connecticut 378 9% 12%
Delaware 37 4% 8%
D.C. 20 8% 8%
Florida 303 3% 3%
Georgia 949 6% 4%
Hawaii 144 13% 3%
Idaho 367 9% 9%
Illinois 2,373 9% 9%
Indiana 1,927 10% 10%
Iowa 5,358 22% 14%
Kansas 2,901 11% 6%
Kentucky 1,362 10% 9%
Louisiana 1,723 13% 9%
Maine 364 15% 13%
Maryland 372 7% 4%
Massachusetts 593 12% 16%
Michigan 1,467 13% 12%
Minnesota 1,209 9% 6%
Mississippi 2,820 17% 7%
Missouri 4,289 18% 12%
Montana 402 8% 4%
Nebraska 2,878 19% 10%
Nevada 44 3% 2%
New Hampshire 373 16% 11%
New Jersey 692 11% 10%
New Mexico 381 10% 10%
New York 2,140 12% 12%
North Carolina 2,442 14% 13%
State Structurally Deficient 
Bridge Deck Area, 
as a Percent of Total 
Bridge Deck Area
Percent of
Bridges that are 
Structurally 
Deficient
Number of  
Structurally 
Deficient 
Bridges
Table A-2: Structurally Deficient Bridge Spans by State, as of December 2009143
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North Dakota 696 16% 7%
Ohio 2,795 10% 8%
Oklahoma 5,286 22% 16%
Oregon 477 7% 8%
Pennsylvania 6,060 27% 20%
Rhode Island 163 22% 27%
South Carolina 1,238 13% 9%
South Dakota 1,231 21% 12%
Tennessee 1,246 6% 6%
Texas 1,752 3% 2%
Utah 169 6% 4%
Vermont 437 16% 16%
Virginia 1,241 9% 6%
Washington 405 5% 9%
West Virginia 1,056 15% 10%
Wisconsin 1,207 9% 6%
Wyoming 401 13% 13%
U.S Total 71,179 12% 9%
State Structurally Deficient 
Bridge Deck Area, 
as a Percent of Total 
Bridge Deck Area
Percent of
Bridges that are 
Structurally 
Deficient
Number of  
Structurally 
Deficient 
Bridges
Table A-2: (Continued)
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Table A-3: Metropolitan Areas with the Highest Additional Operating Costs Due to 
Rough Roads (Populations of 500,000 or More)144
Metropolitan Area Additional
 Annual
 Operating   
 Costs
Los Angeles, CA $746 
San Jose, CA $732 
San Francisco – Oakland, CA $705 
Tulsa, OK $703 
Honolulu, HI  $688 
San Diego, CA $664 
Concord, CA  $656 
New York – Newark, NY-NJ $638 
Riverside – San Bernardino, CA  $632 
Metropolitan Area Additional
 Annual
 Operating   
 Costs
Oklahoma City, OK $631 
Sacramento, CA $622 
New Orleans, LA $622 
Palm Springs – Indio, CA  $608 
Omaha, NE $592 
Baltimore, MD $589 
Albuquerque, NM $576 
Mission Viejo, CA  $571 
San Antonio, TX $529 
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Metropolitan Area Additional
 Annual
 Operating   
 Costs
Alabama  $162 
Alaska  $324 
 Arizona  $207 
Arkansas  $302 
California  $590 
Colorado  $292 
Connecticut  $313 
Delaware  $282 
Florida  $126 
Georgia  $44 
Hawaii  $503 
Idaho  $318 
Illinois  $297 
Indiana  $242 
 Iowa  $383 
Kansas  $318 
Kentucky  $187 
Louisiana  $388 
Maine  $250 
Maryland  $425 
Massachusetts  $301 
Michigan  $370 
Minnesota  $347 
Mississippi  $394 
Missouri  $410 
Montana  $195 
Nebraska  $278 
Nevada  $227 
New Hampshire  $250 
New Jersey  $596 
New Mexico  $279 
New York  $405 
North Carolina  $251 
North Dakota  $238 
Ohio  $209 
Oklahoma  $457 
Oregon  $166 
Pennsylvania  $346 
Rhode Island  $473 
South Carolina  $262 
South Dakota  $319 
Tennessee  $180 
Texas  $336 
Utah  $176 
Vermont  $308 
Virginia  $249 
Washington  $266 
West Virginia  $280 
Wisconsin  $281 
Wyoming  $230 
United States  $335 
 
Metropolitan Area Additional
 Annual
 Operating   
 Costs
Table A-4: Average Additional Operating Costs Due to Rough Roads by State145
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Alabama $214,530,463  $42,523,369  5 4,328,734 $9.82  38
Alaska $71,356,339  $31,240,501  2.3 585,263 $53.38  3
Arizona $271,405,389  $10,098,621  26.9 1,081,039 $9.34  41
Arkansas $214,139,597  $22,392,699  9.6 3,533,423 $6.34  48
California $581,269,027  $249,158,096  2.3 32,058,444 $7.77  46
Colorado $88,126,247  $34,787,014  2.5 3,139,635 $11.08  33
Connecticut $107,082,097  $128,339,741  0.8 3,874,772 $33.12  11
Delaware $29,602,671  $9,853,703  3 134,680 $73.16  1
Dist. of Columbia -$5,226,807 $64,313,381  -0.1 490,976 $130.99  N/A
Florida $621,362,751  $61,347,961  10.1 4,311,103 $14.23  27
Georgia $422,814,972  $103,533,407  4.1 3,087,941 $33.53  10
Hawaii $115,737,026  $10,524,212  11 420,736 $25.01  18
Idaho $64,682,068  $11,885,610  5.4 1,196,725 $9.93  37
Illinois $241,910,860  $218,738,018  1.1 9,986,725 $21.90  20
Indiana $221,522,187  $59,082,892  3.7 6,403,917 $9.23  42
Iowa $111,419,887  $65,510,034  1.7 10,747,847 $6.10  49
Kansas $88,901,722  $49,849,148  1.8 4,977,776 $10.01  36
Kentucky $186,107,004  $28,618,911  6.5 4,395,699 $6.51  47
Louisiana $91,579,570  $123,017,381  0.7 15,030,877 $8.18  44
Maine $14,413,382  $37,546,585  0.4 1,342,562 $27.97  14
Maryland $95,717,858  $62,528,537  1.5 2,258,909 $27.68  15
Massachusetts $38,672,734  $185,099,693  0.2 4,946,416 $37.42  8
Michigan $90,110,375  $154,273,578  0.6 7,788,345 $19.81  21
Minnesota $82,024,993  $101,762,454  0.8 3,128,146 $32.53  12
Mississippi $166,812,274  $293,565,071  0.6 6,511,845 $45.08  4
Missouri $167,117,559  $103,117,424  1.6 11,392,781 $9.05  43
Montana $52,069,130  $29,564,608  1.8 732,714 $40.35  6
Nebraska $78,837,493  $32,204,103  2.4 3,403,833 $9.46  40
Nevada $105,111,970  $12,380,582  8.5 180,483 $68.60  2
New Hampshire $40,043,979  $20,749,207  1.9 1,092,522 $18.99  22
New Jersey $131,822,984  $231,787,585  0.6 6,800,239 $34.09  9
New Mexico $43,721,930  $16,227,548  2.7 1,705,189 $9.52  39
New York $156,194,165  $585,421,542  0.3 13,138,081 $44.56  5
Table A-5. Federal Funds Directed Toward Bridge Repair vs. New Capacity
State
Average Annual 
Spending on New 
Road Capacity,  
2006 - 2008
Average Annual 
Spending on 
Bridge Repair, 
Federal Sources, 
2006 - 2008
Ranking 
(From Most 
to Least 
Spending per 
Sq. Ft.)
Spending 
per 
Sq. Ft.
Ratio of 
Spending on 
New Capacity 
to Bridge 
Repair
Area of 
Structurally 
Deficient 
Bridges 
(Average, 06-
08, Sq. Ft.)
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Sources: Federal Highway’s Fiscal Management 
Information System; National Bridge Inventory.147
New Mexico $43,721,930  $16,227,548  2.7 1,705,189 $9.52  39
New York $156,194,165  $585,421,542  0.3 13,138,081 $44.56  5
North Carolina $497,088,450  $132,632,328  3.7 10,004,934 $13.26  29
North Dakota $37,625,585  $13,089,629  2.9 866,516 $15.11  25
Ohio $239,158,048  $216,966,932  1.1 8,346,452 $26.00  17
Oklahoma $187,223,221  $109,045,858  1.7 13,807,837 $7.90  45
Oregon $41,702,433  $94,489,211  0.4 4,038,865 $23.39  19
Pennsylvania $309,310,906  $248,764,860  1.2 22,928,229 $10.85  34
Rhode Island $11,890,465  $2,580,520  4.6 2,423,582 $1.06  50
South Carolina $68,581,586  $72,652,937  0.9 5,783,351 $12.56  31
South Dakota $39,464,253  $20,983,081  1.9 2,066,067 $10.16  35
Tennessee $351,987,781  $65,070,782  5.4 4,940,642 $13.17  30
Texas $719,362,318  $259,473,177  2.8 8,860,012 $29.29  13
Utah $45,251,729  $10,198,342  4.4 838,370 $12.16  32
Vermont $17,404,548  $20,737,871  0.8 1,545,434 $13.42  28
Virginia $173,877,383  $71,598,504  2.4 4,762,554 $15.03  26
Washington $114,688,226  $165,366,630  0.7 4,392,654 $37.65  7
West Virginia $215,474,233  $53,298,968  4 3,208,609 $16.61  24
Wisconsin $90,356,271  $55,074,829  1.6 3,158,083 $17.44  23
Wyoming $42,208,839  $20,363,104  2.1 773,875 $26.31  16
Table A-5. (Continued)
State
Average Annual 
Spending on New 
Road Capacity,  
2006 - 2008
Average Annual 
Spending on 
Bridge Repair, 
Federal Sources, 
2006 - 2008
Ranking 
(From Most 
to Least 
Spending per 
Sq. Ft.)
Spending 
per 
Sq. Ft.
Ratio of 
Spending on 
New Capacity 
to Bridge 
Repair
Area of 
Structurally 
Deficient 
Bridges 
(Average, 06-
08, Sq. Ft.)
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Table A-6: Federal Dollars Going Toward Bridge Repair in the Largest 25 Metropolitan Areas
Average 
Annual 
Obligation for 
Bridge Repair 
2004 - 2008 RankingMetropolitan Area
Dollars 
per 
Square 
Foot
Area of 
Structurally 
Deficient Bridge 
(Sq. Ft., 2008)
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria,  
DC-VA-MD-WV $80,854,339  1,352,723 $59.77  1
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX $37,086,542  694,945 $53.37  2
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA $29,576,591  616,553 $47.97  3
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI $56,936,225  1,371,534 $41.51  4
New York-Northern New Jersey- 
Long Island, NY-NJ-PA $435,754,735  11,420,572 $38.16  5
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH $114,861,200  3,274,892 $35.07  6
Baltimore-Towson, MD $40,046,689  1,342,647 $29.83  7
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI $91,509,395  3,598,591 $25.43  8
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL $4,723,969  234,003 $20.19  9
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI $109,847,608  5,669,534 $19.38  10
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA $49,722,354  2,775,757 $17.91  11
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA $18,041,057  1,037,665 $17.39  12
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN $17,119,033  1,027,115 $16.67  13
St. Louis, MO-IL $50,934,668  3,058,066 $16.66  14
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA $119,622,676  7,306,888 $16.37  15
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL $14,400,786  1,320,831 $10.90  16
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO $15,504,771  1,607,588 $9.64  17
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington,  
PA-NJ-DE-MD $51,513,884  6,054,086 $8.51  18
Pittsburgh, PA $44,668,391  5,626,675 $7.94  19
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX $25,107,282  3,682,415 $6.82  20
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA $9,830,246  1,546,629 $6.36  21
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA $8,035,832  1,897,681 $4.23  22
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA $29,968,483  7,940,361 $3.77  23
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ $1,084,789  328,334 $3.30  24
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA $6,810,845  3,729,334 $1.83  25
Source: National Bridge Inventory 2008146 
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